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Abstract
Following the rationale for regional redistribution programs de-
scribed in the oﬃcial documents of the European Union, this paper
studies a very simple multi-country model built around two regions: a
core and a periphery. Technological spill-overs link firms’ productivity
in each of the two region, and each country’s territory falls partly in
the core and partly in the periphery, but the exact shares vary across
countries. We find that, in line with the EU view, the eﬃcient re-
gional allocation requires both national and international transfers. If
migration is fully free across all borders, then optimal redistribution
policy results from countries’ uncoordinated policies, obviating the
need for a central agency. But if countries have the option of setting
even imperfect border barriers, then eﬃciency is likely to require co-
ordination on both barriers and international transfers (both of which
will be set optimally at positive levels). The need for coordination
increases as the Union increases in size.
∗This paper owes a large debt to ongoing conversations with Bob Inman. It was
prepared for the meeting on The Economics of Political Integration and Disintegration
held at CORE, Louvain La Neuve, May 24-25, 2002 , and presented at the ESF workshop
on Local Public Goods, Politics and Multijurisdictional Economics, held in Paris, July
2-3,2002. I thank participants and organizers of both meetings and in particular Jacques
Thisse, Shlomo Weber, Hubert Kempf, Myrna Wooders and Fabien Moizeau.
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1 Introduction
A central motivation for redistributive policy in the European Union (EU) is
the concern with regional inequalities - disparities in income, unemployment
and standards of living among regions often belonging to the same country:
Article 158 of the Treaty of Amsterdam reads: " The Community shall aim at
reducing disparities between the level of development of the various regions
and the backwardness of the least favored regions or islands.." Two aspects
deserve to be stressed: first the discussion is explicitly in terms of "cohe-
sion" or "solidarity", recurring terms in EU rhetoric; second, the reference
unit is the region, not the country. Especially when comparing European
redistribution policy with its North American counterpart, it is important
to emphasize that regional inequality cuts across national borders: it is the
inequality between regions belonging to the core of Europe - the rich regions
clustered around Europe’s geographical center - and regions belonging to
the periphery - the poorer regions around the Mediterranean Sea and at the
Eastern and Northern border of the Union. Figure 1.1 shows a map of the re-
gions entitled to redistributive transfers in 2000-06 because of their economic
backwardness, regions whose income per capita, with very few exceptions,
was below 75 percent of the EU average in 1994-99. It is immediate that
these regions lie at the outer borders of the EU territory.1
The analyses of redistributive policy developed for the US and Canada
stress the interaction between a federal government and a number of indi-
vidual states with diﬀerent endowments, but do not, as a rule, include an
intermediate layer of regional inequality that overlaps state borders (for ex-
ample, Boadway and Flatters 1982, Inman 1988, Inman and Rubinfeld 1996,
Wildasin 1991 and 1998). These are models where geographical location
plays a role only because it correlates with particular natural endowments or
because it subjects firms or individuals to a specific state policy. Not sur-
prisingly, then, the rationale for redistributive policy that emerges abstracts
from questions of industrial location and agglomeration eﬀects. In Europe,
on the other hand, redistribution programs are tied closely to the belief that
1EU redistribution policy is enacted through the Structural Funds and organized around
three main objectives. Objective 1 is the development of the poorest regions (70 percent
of total transfers); objective 2 is contributions to regions in "structural diﬃculties", for
example declining rural areas (11 percent of total transfers); objective 3 (12 percent)
is human capital development. The remaining funds are used to support the common
fisheries policy.
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geography matters greatly - and not so much because of natural endow-
ments, but because population density and the concentration of economic
activity diﬀer between the core and the periphery of Europe, and agglom-
eration externalities benefit firms located close to other firms and to thick
markets. The main arguments and the evidence in their support have been
described elsewhere (see for example Puga 2001, Overman and Puga 2002,
Quah 1996). Here we want to emphasize how much this view inspires oﬃcial
EU policy. The Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (European
Commission, 2001) reads for example: "Economic location is characterized
by important externalities" [...], (and) "the emerging picture is one of very
high concentration of activities in central regions, which account for only 14
percent of the land area, but a third of the population and almost half (47%)
of the GDP.[...] In all but 11 of the 88 central regions GDP per head in 1998
was above the EU average, while all but 23 of the 111 peripheral regions had
a level below the average. [...] Productivity in the central regions was 2.4
times higher than in the peripheral ones " (pp29-30).
The goal of this paper is to tell an extremely stylized but not implausible
story that captures this view, and evaluate the redistribution policy, if any,
that derives logically from the approach.
We find that, in line with oﬃcial statements by EU bodies, economic
eﬃciency in our model does indeed entail redistribution, both within a coun-
try and, if countries diﬀer in their distance from the core, across countries.
Whether or not these transfers translate into the need for a centralized policy
is a more delicate issue. The crucial question is the ease of migration. If free
migration holds everywhere, decentralized national policies will be eﬃcient:
because of migration, individuals must enjoy equal utility in all locations,
and national policies will perfectly internalize all externalities abroad. As
long as (positive) regional and international transfers are among the policy
tools under countries’ control, the coordinating actions of a central agency
are not required. This is a well-known result, first made clear by Myers
(1990), and it holds in the model studied in this paper.2
But migration policy is also de facto among a country’s policy tools: even
within the post-Maastricht EU, free labor movement is far from reality, ham-
pered by oﬃcial issues of certification and very real concerns about domestic
labor forces. In a future enlarged EU, free mobility is not envisioned in
2Extensions or qualifications to the original results can be found in Mansoorian and
Myers (1993), Wellisch (1994), Hindriks and Myles (2001).
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the short term. If the countries’ heterogeneity is large enough, at least some
of these countries would prefer to impose barriers to migration; if they do
so, the barriers will prevent them from internalizing perfectly the eﬀects of
their policies abroad and the result will be ineﬃcient. Achieving eﬃciency
then does indeed demand coordination: preventing these countries’ unilat-
eral migration policy requires compensating them for foregoing "secession";
the necessary utility diﬀerentials can only be achieved if migration is in fact
constrained; but at the same time policy decisions must be set at their ef-
ficient levels, something that a central agency can do by choosing correctly
the flows of international transfers. Once we recognize that border control
decisions are endogenous, the approach applied in the literature to questions
of political secessions becomes useful, and the scope for redistribution high-
lighted for example by Bolton and Roland (1997) or Le Breton and Weber
(2001) appears in the analysis. Redistributive transfers then play two roles:
they influence directly the allocation of resources, but they also aﬀect it indi-
rectly by preventing costly unilateral actions. The conclusion by Boldrin and
Canova (2001) that "regional policies serve mostly a redistributional purpose,
motivated by the nature of the political equilibria upon which the European
Union is built" (p.210) fits our interpretation, but loses its somewhat sinister
tone.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
characterizes the eﬃcient allocation; Section 3 studies optimal national poli-
cies; Section 4 analyzes the eﬀects of enlarging the set of countries, and
Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains some of the proofs.
2 The Model
We begin by describing the simple logic of the model, loosely inspired by
Ciccone and Hall (1996). Imagine Europe as a circle, composed of diﬀerent
countries, each a slice of equal size. The contribution of the model is to
introduce "the region" as a third level of analysis: there are two regions, a
central one, the core - the lighter area in Figure 1.2, and an external one, the
periphery - the shaded outer band in the figure. Each country’s territory
comprises areas from both regions, but the exact shares diﬀer across countries
- this is why the smaller circle representing the core is oﬀ-center in the figure.
This is the only source of heterogeneity in the model.
The regions play a role because labor productivity depends on agglomer-
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ation eﬀects which are active at the regional level. Production technology
exhibits constant returns to scale at the firm level but labor productivity,
taken as given by the individual firms, depends in fact on the density of em-
ployed workers in the region. What matters here is whether a firm is located
in the core or in the periphery, and not the existence of national borders: all
firms in the core share the same productivity, as do all firms in the periphery,
independently of their national identity; whereas firms in the same country
but in diﬀerent regions face a diﬀerent technology.
Individuals’ mobility is free within each country and across all countries,
unless barriers to migration are explicitly put in place. But the tendency
towards agglomeration is checked, in part, by congestion costs that capture
the diﬃculty of living in very crowded environments - they are a short-hand
for the increased cost and reduced availability of housing and for congested
local public goods. Congestion costs are local and increase with the density
of inhabitants in the specific national subregion: they can diﬀer both across
regions in the same country and across countries in the same region.
2.1 A Single Country
Consider first the simplest case - a single country in isolation. Its total area
is normalized to 1, of which a share αc (smaller than 1/2) belongs to the
core, while the complementary share αp = 1 − αc belongs to the periphery.
Call nr (r = c, p) the density of workers in region r, or nr ≡ Nr/αr, where
Nr is total labor living and working in the region. The total population,
Nc + Np equals 1. Labor markets are flexible and workers are paid their
marginal product, which in region r equals f(nr), where f is an increasing
function of nr.3 A worker in region r has utility h(nr), equal to his "net
income", or his wage net of congestion costs: h(nr) = f(nr) − c(nr), where
the function c is increasing and convex in nr. To illustrate the workings of the
model with an example, we will posit specific functional forms: f(nr) = nr,
and c(nr) = 12g max(0, nr − 1)
g (g > 1) (congestion costs are negligible until
density reaches a given threshold, and rise steeply then).
In the decentralized equilibrium, workers locate themselves in the two
regions so as to equate their net incomes, if both regions are inhabited, or
3An interesting extension of the model has wages set in the core, for the entire national
territory. The model can then generate unemployment and richer policy prescriptions.
Here we concentrate on the role of agglomeration eﬀects, and ignore labor markets rigidi-
ties.
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concentrate in one of the two. Taking into account np = 1−αcncαp , denote by
hp(nc) ≡ h(np) the net income of a worker in the periphery, as function of the
density in the core. Given αc < 1/2, hp(nc) is everywhere decreasing in nc,
while h(nc), the net income of a core worker, may have an interior maximum
at some n∗c > 2 if g is larger than a threshold g0(αc), i.e. if the congestion
costs are suﬃciently convex. The two functions are drawn in Figure 2.1,
from which the equilibria can be easily read. With our functional forms
there are always three equilibria: one is always the interior symmetrical
equilibrium with np = nc = 1, equal productivity and equal congestion costs
in both regions; the second is always the equilibrium with full concentration
in the periphery; the third has either complete concentration in the core or,
possibly, high (nc > 2) but incomplete concentration in the core if g is larger
than a threshold bg(αc) > g0(αc). Note that the interior equilibrium is always
dominated by complete concentration in the periphery.4
Individuals making their location choice ignore their individual contribu-
tion to a region’s productivity, and in general the decentralized equilibrium
will not be optimal. Consider then the problem of a policy-maker, directly
choosing the allocation of workers between the two regions. The policy
maker maximizes H = Nch(nc) +Nph(np) - with given total population and
free mobility across regions, maximizing aggregate net income or per capita
income is equivalent. Notice that in all equilibria of the decentralized prob-
lem h(nc) = H(nc) (or hp(nc) = H(nc) if there is full concentration in the
periphery). Thus we can deduce immediately from Figure 2.1 that the sym-
metrical allocation cannot be a global maximum - as mentioned above it is
always dominated by complete concentration in the periphery (hp(0) > 1).
Congestion costs are not diﬀerentiable at np = nc = 1, but given that this
point can be ruled out, we can use standard calculus to characterize the op-
timal partition of workers, taking into account the two diﬀerent cases nc < 1
and nc > 1. It is not diﬃcult to establish that there cannot be an interior
maximum for nc < 1, but the conclusion changes for nc > 1: if congestion
costs are suﬃciently convex, an interior maximum exists at n∗∗c ∈ (2, 1/αc),
and the function H(nc) has the shape depicted in Figure 2.2. The necessary
4The threshold g0 solves ∂h(nc)∂nc = 0 at nc = 1/αc, and the threshold bg solves h(nc) = 0
at nc = 1/αc. Or: g0 = 1 + ln 2/ ln(αp/αc); bg = ln 2/ ln(αp/αc) + [ln bg + ln(1/αc)]/
ln(αp/αc). Full concentration equilibria result from the simple functional forms chosen
- richer specifications of the agglomeration externalities would easily lead to less extreme
outcomes. But full concentration is particularly simple and is maintained here, with the
caveat that it should not be read as specially meaningful.
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threshold for g, which we call eg(αc) is smaller than bg(αc), i.e. is compatible
with full concentration in the core in the decentralized equilibrium.5 Three
considerations conclude the characterization of the global optimum. First,
if an interior maximum exists, it is unique.6 Second, if an interior maximum
exists, it always dominates full concentration in the core, but it may or may
not dominate concentration in the periphery - again this will depend on the
degree of convexity of the congestion costs. The parameter g must be lower
than a ceiling g(αc), where g(αc) < bg(αc). If αc is not too small, the interval
[eg(αc), g(αc)] is guaranteed to be not empty.7 Third, if the global maxi-
mum is interior, then it cannot be a solution of the decentralized problem.
As shown in Figure 2.1, if the decentralized problem has two interior solu-
tions, the symmetrical one always dominates the other, but we know that the
symmetrical solution is dominated by full concentration in the periphery.
In conclusion, there is a range of values for the parameter g such that
the global optimum is interior: it has high, but not complete concentration
in the core. This allocation is not a solution of the decentralized problem,
while complete concentration in the core is, for the same range of g values.
It is on this case - g ∈ (eg(αc), g(αc)) - that we concentrate in what follows.
The first result is immediate. We know from Figure 2.1 that at these
parameter values net income in the core is higher than net income in the
periphery for all nc > 1. To support the global optimum the policy-maker
will need to use redistributive tools: transfers must take place from the core
to the periphery.8




if g ∈ (1, 2], thus no interior maximum exists. For nc > 1, n∗∗c must satisfy: 4gαp =
(n∗∗c − 1)g−2[n∗∗c (1 + g)− 1]; 4 < (n∗∗c − 1)g−2[n∗∗c
(1+g)
2 − 1]. The threshold eg(αc) solves
the first of these equations at nc = 1/αc, or: eg = 1+ ln 2/ ln(αp/αc) + 1/ ln(αp/αc)[ln 2 +
ln eg − ln(αp + eg)]
6It is easy to show that if H(nc) is concave at n∗∗c , then it is concave at all nc > n∗∗c .
7A suﬃcient condition guaranteeing that the interior maximum, if it exists, is the global
maximum is that concentration in the core dominates concentration in the periphery:
h(1/αc) > hp(0). This condition corresponds to g < g”(αc) < bg(αc). Checking whethereg(αc) < g”(αc) is simple and implies a lower bound for αc. But the suﬃcient condition
is too strong, and a non-empty range of acceptable g values exists for a larger range of αc
values (as can be verified in numerical exercises).
8Note that the story is static, and the subsidies to the periphery have the sole scope
of reducing internal migration flows and limiting congestion in the core. Richer stories
could be told - where the subsidies take the form of public investment aimed at improving
future productivity, but it is not clear that the simple static model is really oﬀ the mark.
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The important variable at the center of the model is the share of the
country’s area belonging to the core. The smaller is such a share, the higher
is density in the decentralized equilibrium with full concentration in the core.
If such concentration is suboptimal, net income is lower the smaller the core
area - in such equilibria, we can think of countries with smaller core area as
"poorer". In addition, the size of the core area influences the optimal dis-
tribution of workers between the two regions, as well as the optimal internal
redistribution policy. In particular, if the global optimum is interior, totally




the larger the core area, the higher the optimal concentration in the core
(the intuition is straightforward: as the core area increases, maintaining the
same concentration requires moving workers into the core, reducing the pop-
ulation in the periphery, and hence the value of supporting salaries there).
In all numerical exercises we have run, if the global optimum does not have
full concentration, the smaller the core area, the larger the share of national
income redistributed from the core to the periphery.
2.2 Multiple Countries
We are now ready to extend the model to multiple countries. Begin with the
simplest case of two, 1 and 2, each with a population normalized to 1. The
two countries are identical, but for the share of their territory belonging to
the core region: if country 1’s core area is α1c, call α2c the core area of country
2, where α2c < α1c (we will use progressively higher country labels to indicate
progressively smaller core areas). Labor productivity in each region depends
on labor density in the region, regardless of the national label of each worker.
Thus, if we call Nir the labor force in the r region of country i (and nir the
corresponding labor density), then total labor density in region r is given by
(N1r+N2r)/(α1r+α2r) = (α1rn1r+α2rn2r)/(α1r+α2r). It is this labor density
that aﬀects labor productivity, which now therefore becomes f(n1r, n2r), or,
in the specific example we are using here, (α1rn1r + α2rn2r)/(α1r + α2r).
Congestion costs on the other hand are local, hence they equal c(nir) =
1
2g max(0, nir − 1)g in each country i.
The goal of this section is to investigate whether, in line with oﬃcial Euro-
pean motivations for regional transfers, the optimal allocation in this model
In Italy, for example, convincing readings of the redistribution policy towards the South
see it linked, in large part, to the need to contain social tensions in Northern industrial
cities, after the large internal migration flows of the Fifties and Sixties.
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require international transfers. But before addressing this question directly,
we need to evaluate the equilibria without policy intervention. Consider the
decentralized equilibria in the two countries when migration is free. There
are equilibria where one country becomes empty, but we will ignore them
here and focus instead on distributions of workers such that both countries
are inhabited. With equal productivity and equal wages in the two core
areas (and similarly in the two periphery areas), regardless of national bor-
ders, workers will migrate so as to equate congestion costs. If both regions
are inhabited in both countries, then n1r = n2r, r ∈ {c, p}.9 If instead the
equilibrium is a corner solution and workers concentrate in one region, fol-
lowing the same reasoning we know that the region must be the same in both
countries (or workers will move, within the same region, to the less congested
country). Thus if all workers concentrate in the core (periphery), we must
have n1c = n2c ≡ nc (n1p = n2p ≡ np). When all workers concentrate in the
core and the density is equalized across countries, then we also know that
such a density must equal 1/αc where αc ≡ 1/2(α1c + α2c), the mean of
the core shares (and similarly when workers concentrate in the periphery).
Because densities must be equalized across countries, we can study the pos-
sible equilibria with the help of a figure that is almost identical to Figure
2.2, taking into account nc ∈ [0, 1/αc] and np = 1/αp− (αc/αp)nc. For the
larger core country 1, this is Figure 3.1, where the thin line corresponds to
the autarky case analyzed in the previous section.10
We can conclude that, once again, there are only three candidate equilib-
ria: an interior equilibrium at nc = np = 1, a corner solution at (nc = 0, np =
1/αp), and, if g < bg(αc), a second corner solution with full concentration in
the core: (nc = 1/αc, np = 0). Before analyzing the implications of these
equilibria, notice that everything we have said carries over identically to the
case of multiple countries: in all equilibria with free migration, the densities
of workers must be equalized across countries, and in equilibrium they will
either equal 1 everywhere or, if congestion costs are not too convex, equal 0
in one region and the inverse of the average region share in the Union in the
9More precisely, this need only be true in the region where density is larger than 1. In
the other, congestion costs are 0, and the national distribution of workers - which does not
aﬀect productivity - is irrelevant. It follows that per capita income is independent of the
distribution of workers as long as their density is smaller than 1, and in studying it we
can focus on n1r = n2r, r ∈ {c, p} without loss of generality. We will return to this point.
10For the smaller core country 2, the function hp(nc) tilts up, as opposed to tilting down,
and the upper boundary of admissible nc values (1/αc) falls, as opposed to increasing.
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other.
From these conclusions, we can then immediately predict migration flows,
although they will depend on which of the three equilibria emerges. Focus
on the case of full concentration in the core. Then, if nc = 1/αc ∀i, it follows
immediately that Nic = Ni = αic/ αc, or Ni > 1⇔ αic > αc: countries with
core regions larger than the mean will be migration recipients, and countries
with core regions smaller than the mean will be migration sources. Notice
that if congestion costs are suﬃciently convex - i.e. if we are in the range
g ∈ (eg(α1c), g(αnc))11 - then, starting from full concentration in the core,
immigration reduces per capita net income (because it increases an already
too high density), while emigration does the opposite. Thus countries that
are targets of immigration will be tempted to close their borders to incoming
flows of workers. Once we introduce explicit policies, however, simply closing
the borders will not be an equilibrium: both countries will consider the full
range of available policy tools, including internal redistribution between core
and periphery workers, migration barriers and international aid. We leave
the analysis of these cases to the next section.
Notice that the meaning of "integration" here deserves a few comments. It
is tempting to compare the results above to the single country case analyzed
earlier, and in particular to rank welfare, here per capita income. The same
logic used earlier would lead us to conclude that large core countries lose
from integration, while small core countries gain (across equilibria with full
concentration in the core). But the comparison is misleading because two
diﬀerent assumptions change between the two cases. One is free migration, a
policy choice appropriately identified among the characteristics of integrated
economies; but the second is technology: whether or not a country’s regional
productivities are subject to spill-overs from abroad. It is not clear that this
latter feature is under a country’s control - most probably it is not, and in
this paper we take these spill-overs as part of the exogenous technological
environment. Thus the comparison to the single-country analysis above
cannot be interpreted as a comparison between integration and autarky.
Consider now the global optimum in the two-country example. The first
observation is that the density of workers cannot be larger than 1 in one na-
tional core (or periphery), while being smaller than 1 in the other: with equal
productivity, independently of national borders, and convex congestion costs,
regional densities must be equalized. If the optimum has high concentration
11Where core shares must be such that the interval is not empty
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in the core, then n∗∗1c = n∗∗2c = n∗∗c . The statement requires convex costs,
and thus does not apply to the international distribution of workers in the
periphery, where their density is always below 1. The observation, already
made in the decentralized equilibrium, was finally irrelevant there because it
only applies to interior equilibria, and even then not to the symmetrical one.
Here we proceed for now setting n∗∗1p = n∗∗2p = n∗∗p , even when both densities
are smaller than 1, a choice that has no implication for per capita income
or for the characterization of the optimal density in the core. However, it
does aﬀect migration flows and international transfers, and we will discuss
the matter further below.
With densities equalized across countries, we can once again exploit the
single country analysis, again taking into account nc ∈ [0, 1/αc] and np =
1/αp− (αc/αp)nc. If g ∈ (eg(α1c), g(α2c)), both functions have an interior
maximum at high but not complete concentration in the core. It follows
that the global optimum will also be an interior solution. Figure 3.2 depicts
the result, where the two thin lines correspond to the two single country
cases, with diﬀerent core shares. Notice, trivially, that both countries are
guaranteed higher per capita income in the global optimum than in the de-
centralized equilibrium: migration ensures that income must be equalized
everywhere and the global optimum maximizes it by definition.
If the global optimum is interior, then it is associated with internal re-
distribution, and if n1p = n2p, this must be true in each country. But is
international redistribution always a feature of the global optimum? The
answer is closely tied to migration flows. If n1p = n2p, we can establish two
results: (1) There must be migration into the large core country; (2) There
must be international redistribution in favor of the small core country. To see
why (1) must hold, notice if densities are equalized, then N1c = (a1c/α2c)N2c
and N1p = (a1p/α2p)N2p. By substitution, we can then verify immediately
that N1c +N1p ≤ N2c +N2p ⇐⇒ nc ≤ np, a condition that cannot be satis-
fied if the global optimum is interior. Establishing (2) is simpler still: if
densities are equalized, the number of workers in the core region is higher in
the large core county, and viceversa for periphery workers. But salaries and
congestion costs are equalized across core regions (and periphery regions).
Thus per capita transfers paid by core workers and received by periphery
workers must be equalized. It follows that the total flow of transfers paid
by the core region in country 1 must be higher than in country 2, while the
total flow received in the periphery of country 1 must be smaller than for the
periphery of country 2 - some of the funds must be crossing borders.
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These results generalize easily to the case of multiple countries. We can
state:
Proposition 1. Consider a world with n countries and free migration.
If the global optimum is interior, n∗∗ic = n∗∗c > 1∀i, and the optimal alloca-
tion n∗∗c and per capita income h(n∗∗c ) = hp(n∗∗c ) depend only on the mean
core share αc. In addition, if nip = np∀i, then: (i) All countries whose
core shares are larger than the mean are migration recipients; and all coun-
tries with core shares smaller than the mean are migration sources; (ii) All
countries whose core shares are larger than the mean are net disbursers of
international transfers, and all countries with core shares smaller than the
mean are net recipients. (The proof is in the Appendix).
If nip 6= njp for some i, j, the prediction is less clean, because the total
population in each country is not pinned down - any international distribution
of periphery workers such that nip < 1∀i is compatible with the optimum;
it would not change n∗c , or per capita income, but it does change popula-
tion sizes and transfer flows. These asymmetrical equilibria arise from the
absence of congestion costs when densities are smaller than 1 - a rather spe-
cial but not unrealistic assumption. We discuss them briefly here because
they will be useful reference points in the next section. Migration flows
and international transfers are substitutes in this model. In the symmetri-
cal equilibrium studied above, per capita incomes are equalized when some
transfers flow from the larger to the smaller core countries; in the absence
of these transfers, further migration would take place into the peripheries of
the larger core countries, until all taxes collected on core residents are trans-
ferred to each country’s own periphery. Notice that the global optimum
characterizes n∗c uniquely - hence the additional migration can only be to
the peripheries of countries with larger than average core areas. Similarly,
the global optimum can be implemented with an allocation that requires no
migration, but larger international transfers - again the only diﬀerence is the
density of periphery workers; with fewer periphery workers in countries that
were migration targets, a larger share of taxes collected on core workers goes
abroad.12
12(1) Call per capita taxes collected in the cores tc and per capita transfers in the





Nip. In the absence of international transfers, tcNic = τpNip. Simple
manipulation shows that the two conditions yield: Nic+Nip = αic/αc. If the correspond-
ing densities in the peripheries are everywhere smaller than 1 and nc = n∗c > 1, the global
12
3 Optimal National Policies
Having established the features of the optimal policy in this setting, we can
now ask a question that is central to the actual working of redistribution
policy in the European Union. The optimal policy requires international
transfers - but does it require a central agency, or would it emerge even
without coordination, from the decentralized interactions of the individual
countries? On one hand, it is clear that the technological spill-overs cre-
ate important externalities among countries - if eﬀects abroad are ignored,
national choices of internal transfers, and thus of regional densities, will be
suboptimal. But if migration is free, as we have assumed so far, national pol-
icy makers should take into account the eﬀect of their policies on migration
flows, or, equivalently, on per capita incomes abroad: free migration provides
the channel through which the international impacts of national policies are
internalized. The observation, originally due to Myers (1990), applies here
and is the logical starting point of our analysis of optimal national policies:
Proposition 2 (Myers, 1990). Suppose migration is free. Each country
chooses the density of its citizens in its two regions, and is free to distrib-
ute (non-negative) transfers abroad. Then the decentralized equilibrium will
replicate the global optimum. (The proof is in the Appendix)
Proposition 2 leads to two further observations. First, and most obvi-
ously, the optimality of the decentralized policy equilibrium will not follow
if migration is costly. This model has the advantage of making quite clear
the reason: the problem is not the insuﬃcient migration flow per se - after
all there exists here a global optimum with no migration - but the fact that
migration costs limit the extent to which foreign consequences of national
optimum can be implemented with no international transfers. But only if accompanied






which implies smaller migration flows. (2) Similarly, the global
optimum can be implemented with an allocation that requires no migration, but larger
international transfers. In the absence of migration, each country’s population equals 1,
and with n∗c > 1 everywhere, Nip = 1 − Nic < 1− αic = αip, or nip < 1 everywhere, as
required. The diﬀerence is in the periphery population, which now equals 1− αicnc, as
opposed to 1− αcnc in the symmetrical equilibrium. With equal taxes collected in the
core, funds transferred abroad (received from abroad) are larger if the core share is larger
than the mean (smaller than the mean).
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policies are internalized.13 In this case, the need for a central agency and
a centralized policy is immediate, although it can be argued that its first
mandate should be the elimination of migration costs, as opposed to redis-
tribution policy. The policy point is not new, but is important: facilitating
migration would be a more direct route to higher global welfare than a pro-
gram of international transfers.14 The second observation is slightly more
subtle, and clarifies why migration flows should be the object of treaties
and coordinated policy in most circumstances. The fact that free migration
would lead countries to replicate the global optimum does not imply that it is
individually optimal for each of them. If migration barriers are a policy tool
under the control of countries’ policy-makers, then the analysis of optimal
national polices should allow for countries choosing whether or not to set up
border barriers. If indeed we find that a country would prefer to deviate
from the free migration equilibrium and close its borders to foreign workers,
then reestablishing the global optimum would require the presence of a coor-
dinated policy including transfers in the country’s favor. But here we face a
contradiction: diﬀerences in incomes cannot be sustained without some cost
to migration. We reach the conclusion that some barriers to migration might
be optimally preserved but would need to be set in a coordinated manner
and accompanied by correct complementary policies.
To clarify this second point, proceed by stages, assuming the absence of
exogenous migration costs. Consider the temptation to deviate unilaterally
from the global optimum - the free migration equilibrium - by closing bor-
ders. More precisely, think of the decision problem as a two-stage game.
In the first stage, countries simultaneously decide whether or not to close
their borders to migration flows; in the second stage, given migration pol-
icy decisions, countries choose their regional densities, or, equivalently, their
internal and external transfers. We want to ask whether free migration is
an equilibrium. A country (or group of countries acting jointly) deviating
and setting up border barriers anticipates the optimal transfer policy of the
other countries in stage 2, but takes as given their border policy. Notice
13In more standard models, this point is seen most clearly when countries are identical
and the equilibrium is symmetrical. Then both the global optimum and the decentralized
equilibrium induce no migration, but whether they lead to the same allocation of resources
still depends on the absence of migration costs.
14Rodrik (2002) argues that a scheme of multilaterally negotiated visa for developing
countries’ workers would "likely create income gains that are larger than all the items on
the WTO negotiating agenda taken together".
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that given Proposition 2, we can think of a set of countries among which mi-
gration is free as choosing their regional densities so as to maximize jointly
their total income.15 In addition, because the optimal allocation among any
set of countries does not depend on the individual core share of each country
in the set, but only on the average core share of the set (by an immediate ex-
tension of Proposition 1), we can always study the temptation for unilateral
deviation as a two country problem, the candidate for deviation, country i,
and the rest of the world, −i.
Call α−ic the mean core share in the rest of the world, i.e. excluding
country i. The first immediate observation is that if all countries were
identical, there would be no incentive to deviate. The problem is analogous
to that of two identical countries choosing between the global optimum and
a Nash equilibrium with closed borders. In both cases, incomes per capita
are equalized everywhere, and by definition they are maximized in the global
optimum: setting up migration barriers can only lead to lower welfare. But
matters change when countries diﬀer. We can show:
Lemma 1. If the global optimum is interior, there exists a threshold
σ < 1 such that if α−ic/αic ≤ σ, country i prefers to close its borders.
Proof. To see why this is the case, consider the limiting case, where
α−ic = 0. When country i closes its borders, there are no international
transfers or migration between i and −i, n−ip = 1, and n∗ic is set so as to
maximize country i’s income. When borders are open, on the other hand,
spillovers are taken into account: if the global maximum is interior, n∗∗c must
be larger than 1, but it is diﬀerent, and smaller than n∗ic (because productivity
in the periphery, the only relevant objective in the rest of the world, is strictly
decreasing in the density of workers in i’s core). In addition, at n∗∗c > 1
income in the periphery must be strictly smaller than income in the core
(because it is equal at nc = 1 and strictly decreasing in nc for all nc ≥ 1)
and transfers must be flowing from the core to the periphery and hence, as
long as there is any population left abroad, from country i to the rest of the
15We can think of migration policy decisions as a coalitional problem. All such decisions
are made simultaneously and the equilibrium concept we use is Strong Nash - free migration
is an equilibrium if no country, or group of country, has an incentive to set up barriers,
given the absence of barriers among its complement countries. On the other hand,
transfer decisions are made in period 2, and here it is appropriate to require that, given
the coalitional structure, transfer policies are correctly anticipated. In the language of
Hindriks and Myles (2001), we are studying a membership-based equilibrium, as opposed
to a policy-based equilibrium.
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world. Comparing country i’s welfare with closed borders and in the global
optimum is particularly easy when the global optimum is implemented with
no migration. In this case, n−ip = 1 by necessity; the only two diﬀerences
are the outflowing transfers and the smaller core density at n∗∗c . Since the
allocation abroad is unchanged, i is transferring resources to the rest of the
world and n∗∗c does not maximize i’s income, it follows that country i must
be worse oﬀ in the global optimum: it strictly prefers to close its borders.
In the global optimum, per capita income is determined uniquely, hence the
result holds more generally, for any equilibrium migration flows. Because
the problem has no discontinuities in core shares, the result will continue to
hold for α−ic close to zero but positive, until a threshold σ is reached, and we
know from the reasoning above that σ < 1, since there can be no deviation
when countries are identical.16
Notice that the equivalence between a single country with core share αic
and a group of countries with mean core share αc = αic can be exploited
to derive two immediate corollaries of Lemma 1. First, by definition of the
global optimum, when country i prefers to close its borders, i’s complement
−i must prefer free migration (or global income would not be maximized).
But i’s complement −i is equivalent to a single country j with core share
αjc = α−ic: we can then rephrase the lemma from the point of a view of a
country j, and state that there exists a σ > 1 such that for α−jc/αjc ≥ σ
country j must prefer open borders. Second, Lemma 1 can be read in terms
of incentives for joint deviation by any subset S of countries with mean core
share αSc suﬃciently larger than the overall mean (α−Sc/αSc ≤ σ). Notice
that with α1c > α2c > .. > αnc, if country 1 has no incentive to close its
borders, neither does any other country acting unilaterally, or any possible
subset of countries acting jointly. We can identify the frailty of the free
migration equilibrium by focussing on the unilateral incentive to deviation
of country 1 alone.
Lemma 1 implies that if the global optimum is to be implemented when
countries are suﬃciently asymmetrical, some compensation towards the larger
core countries is necessary. Notice that we are not stating that this is always
16For these arguments to hold, the convexity parameter g must be compatible with an
interior maximum both in the global optimum and when the country closes its borders,
and for diﬀerent values of α−ic. In numerical simulations, we have had no diﬃculty finding
an acceptable range of g values for α−ic ∈ [0, αic). The values of σ found in the numerical
exercizes were typically large, a 3-4 percent diﬀerence in core share being suﬃcient to
trigger deviation.
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feasible. The definition of global optimum implies that a country or a group
acting jointly can be induced by its complement - the set of remaining coun-
tries - to forego the introduction of migration barriers, not that every indi-
vidual country, or subset of countries, can simultaneously be prevented from
doing so. With more than two countries, the second objective is much more
problematic. All we can say at this stage is that if the eﬃcient regional allo-
cation can be supported in equilibrium, then compensating transfers must be
taking place. In other words, either countries are similar enough that coun-
try 1 prefers open borders - in which case free migration is optimal, countries
should be left to set their transfers, domestically and internationally, without
explicit coordination, and the main role of an international agency should be
limited to eliminating existing migration costs. Or countries are dissimilar
enough that country 1 prefers to set up migration barriers - in which case free
migration cannot be maintained in equilibrium, and barriers will be put in
place. But migration barriers prevent countries from internalizing fully the
external eﬀects of their internal regional policies, and, unless coordinated,
the outcome will be ineﬃcient. The eﬃcient allocation of workers among
the diﬀerent regions may be sustained only if accompanied by a cooperative
agreement on migration and international transfers.17 We can conclude:
Proposition 3. Suppose exogenous migration costs are zero, but coun-
tries are free to create barriers to migration. Then, if α−1c/α1c > σ, the
global optimum is implemented through uncoordinated national policies. If
α−1c/α1c ≤ σ and the global optimum is interior, the eﬃcient allocation can
only be implemented through a coordinated agreement targeting jointly migra-
tion barriers and international transfers.
The Proposition follows from Lemma 1. If large core countries must be
compensated for not acting unilaterally, their citizens must enjoy higher per
capita income, hence migration cannot be free. Migration costs must be set
equal to the required diﬀerential in per capita income. But international
transfer flows must then be set cooperatively to generate the correct regional
densities nic = n∗∗c ∀i. This last point is shown in the Appendix.18
17It may be possible, especially if information problems are not too severe, to devise
decentralized schemes that would implement the social optimum (see for example Varian
1994 or Piketty 1996). We are making the simpler point that the decentralized equilibrium
of the game we are describing would not be eﬃcient.
18Notice that, given n∗∗c , lump-sum transfers among any subset of countries are irrelevant
from the point of view of the countries’ complement, and in particular do not aﬀect their
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The result, ex post not too surprising, still sheds some light on current
discussions in the European Union. As the size of the Union, and most im-
portantly its diversity are due to increase, the fundamental tension between
centralization of responsibilities and national autonomies is again evident.
As one would expect, national governments appear more than ever jealous of
their sovereignty and read the anticipated presence in the Union of new and
"further away" members as requiring larger national powers, relative to the
centralized institutions of the EU. These institutions on the other hand, and
the Commission preeminently among them, see a larger Union as requiring
more coordinated actions, exactly as counterpart of its increased diversity.19
Our model gives qualified support to the Commission’s position: the larger
heterogeneity of the future Union will indeed require more coordination, to
prevent negative spillovers from the correspondingly more heterogenous poli-
cies of the member states. But part of any coordinated agreement must be
easing the concerns of the current members, to prevent them from adopt-
ing policies that would become serious obstacles to any form of substantial
market integration.
The question of enlargement deserves more thought, and we turn to it
now.
4 Enlargement
We define enlargement as a pure policy question. A Union in our model is a
group of countries whose policies implement the jointly optimal regional den-
sity, either because they choose to allow free migration across their borders,
or because they have a common agreement on border controls and transfers.
Technological spill-overs are taken as given and may link a larger number of
countries than those forming the Union, but outside the Union migration is
prevented and international transfers do not take place. The question is ex-
actly whether, in the presence of these spill-overs, the original Union chooses
incentive to deviate.
19A summary view of the debate can be found in the Summer 2002 issue of the CESifo
Forum, reporting on the Munich Economic Summit of June 7-8, 2002. Among the oﬃcial
documents, see European Commission (2002) and, making the case for the member states,
European Parliament (2002). As for policy actions, the public debate on the interpretation
of the Stability Pact in the Summer months of 2002, as large member countries approach
the ceiling on governement deficit, is clearly indicative of national impatience with EU
constraints.
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to expand and admit new members. The model represents a situation where
markets are de facto already integrated, and the question of integrating poli-
cies presents itself - a not implausible description of the expansion of the
European Union towards the countries of Eastern Europe.
As we have seen, one advantage of our model is to it lends itself easily
to the case of multiple countries. In particular, the results of the previous
section anticipate the diﬀerent incentives towards enlargement faced by dif-
ferent members of an original Union. Suppose that countries considered for
enlargement have progressively smaller core shares - hence, given n countries,
the first question is whether 1 and 2 want to form a Union; then whether they
want to include 3, if 3 wants to join; then whether 1, 2, and 3 want to admit
4, etc. Enlargement then reduces the mean core share in the Union, and by
Proposition 1 modifies the flow of transfers and migration. In particular,
if the joint optimum is interior, convexity in congestion costs continues to
require n∗∗ic = n∗∗c for all countries belonging to the Union; if we focus on the
symmetrical equilibrium with n∗∗ip = n∗∗p then we know that countries in the
Union will be sources of international transfers and recipients of immigra-
tion or viceversa depending on whether their core share is above or below
the Union mean.20 In terms of transfers and migration then, the impact of
enlargement will be most obviously felt by those countries that move from
below to above the Union mean as a result of the entry of new members:
while net receivers of Union’s funds before enlargement, they are asked to
become net contributors; while sources of migration abroad before, they are
transformed into destination countries for foreign workers. The parallel to
Spain or Ireland in the current debate on Eastern enlargement is hard to
avoid.
Changes in transfer and migration flows do not per se imply changes in
per capita income. We do know however, by Lemma 1, that if the entry of
a new country reduces the Union’s core share too much, the old members,
acting together, would move to prevent enlargement. This observation is
intriguing but incomplete. It ignores both the individual incentives of old
members to put obstacles to enlargement (in addition to their possible joint
action), and the potential for compensating transfers, here the willingness of
new members to accept reduced transfers in exchange for being allowed to
join the Union.
20The reasoning is identical to the proof of Proposition 1, regardless of the presence of
non-Union countries.
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To see more concretely how compensation can change the picture, we
have studied a simple numerical example, whose results are reported in Fig-
ure 5. There are three countries with core shares α1c = 0.4, α2c = 0.375 and
α3c = 0.325, and the convexity parameter g is set equal to 5. Two scenarios
are considered, a partial Union formed by countries 1 and 2, and a Union
comprising all three countries. The top half of the figure reports the changes
in per capita income associated with enlargement, in the first case starting
from a prior situation where all countries are isolated and moving to a partial
Union; in the second case moving from the partial to the complete Union.
On the left are the results in the absence of compensation, or equivalently
with free movement of labor among Union members: country 1 opposes the
partial Union, favored instead by country 2 (and by country 3, although 3
remains outside), and, starting from a partial Union, both 1 and 2 oppose
admitting 3. It is clear however that in each case the perspective member
would gain, indeed in this example the gain is always enough to compensate
the losing member(s). On the top right side of the figure are the changes in
per capita income brought about by enlargement after compensation: When
2 compensates 1 for the formation of a partial Union, 1must be made at least
indiﬀerent - the figure assumes that all remaining surplus is appropriated by
2, but the important point is simply that some surplus remains.21 When
moving from a partial to a complete Union, in the absence of compensa-
tion 1 and 2 suﬀer the same loss (income per capita is equalized by free
mobility within the Union), but their threat points diﬀer: because 1 has a
larger core share, it finds unilateral deviation from the complete Union more
advantageous and needs to be compensated correspondingly more. Again,
compensation is possible and all three countries stand to gain from enlarge-
ment.22
The bottom half of the figure reports international transfers as percentage
of each country’s total income. Compensation requires positive migration
21We have also assumed that no compensation comes from 3, although 3 too benefits
from the partial Union.
22In other words, if the only policy choice available to 1 and 2 was whether or not to
admit 3, 3 should compensate them both equally, at least to their point of indiﬀerence;
but in fact each country has the additional option of unilateral deviation, and here the
potential gains diﬀer. Again, the figure assumes that all remaining surplus is enjoyed by 3.
As noticed in the discussion of Lemma 1, unilateral deviation is more advantageous than
joint deviation for country 1 and less advantageous for country 2. In practice, unilateral
deviation should be interpreted as recourse to policies that ignore common agreements, a
very real temptation that seems well to acknowledge.
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costs, and if these costs are mostly deadweight losses (think for example
of bureaucratic obstacles to free movement), then the eﬃcient allocation in
this model has no migration at all. Thus we have used the reference case
of no migration for the figure, but nothing substantive depends on it. On
the left are international transfers in the absence of compensation; positive
values are outgoing transfers, negative values are incoming ones. Countries
with core shares larger than the Union’s mean are sources of transfers, and
particularly so in the absence of migration. When country 2 moves from
being below the mean (in the partial Union) to being above (in the complete
Union) its transfers correspondingly turn from negative to positive. The
figure reports very large transfer flows: with no migration barriers in place
and our parameter values, preventing the entry of workers from country 3
requires international transfers of the order of 10 percent of 3’s GDP. Of
course, the specific number is irrelevant here; what matters is the impact
of compensation in reducing the flows. The right side of the figure reports
equilibrium transfers when enlargement is beneficial for all members: transfer
flows do not change sign, but as expected their magnitude is greatly reduced
(notice that the scale of the diagram is halved).
The image of enlargement, and of a functioning Union, that emerges
when compensation is taken into account seems plausible. Instead of be-
ing coerced into accepting a Union that would be too onerous for them,
richer countries are induced to favor it by policies that reduce integration
just enough to protect their higher standard of living, while allowing new
members to reap new benefits. Once again, this would not be possible in
the absence of a coordinated agreement.
5 Conclusions
The oﬃcial documents of the European Union base the need for redistribution
policy on the large inequality existing among regions of the Union. Individual
regions are contained within national borders, but the areas of intervention
naturally straddle countries’ frontiers and form an additional overlapping
layer between decision-making at the Union level and national jurisdictions.
The regions with the lowest standards of living, the main targets of transfers,
are located almost invariably at the periphery of the Union, supporting the
view that geography matters. This belief is implied or stated repeatedly in
the Union’s documents: physical distance from the core of the Union and the
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most densely populated, urbanized and industrialized regions located there
is costly.
This paper has studied a very simple model that starts from a stylized
description of the Union’s view and asks what redistribution policy, if any,
should follow logically. The model assumes technological spillovers that are
constrained geographically: all firms in the core share the same productivity,
as do all firms in the periphery, and since each country is assumed to contain
parts of both regions, firms’ productivity can vary within the same country.
Thus the natural "economic borders" are regional, while policy decisions
are taken at the national and possibly at the Union level. Countries diﬀer
because diﬀerent shares of their territory belong to the core.
We have found that under plausible conditions eﬃciency will indeed re-
quire both interregional transfers within the same country, and international
transfers within the Union (or, identically, international interregional trans-
fers). If countries cannot impose obstacles to labor movements, the desirable
transfers do not require a coordinated Union-level policy: they follow imme-
diately from countries internalizing through free migration the external ef-
fects of their domestic regional policies - a well-known result in the literature
(Myers, 1990). However, if countries can impose obstacles to immigration
(whether oﬃcially or not), then the need for a coordinated agreement is likely
to arise. Countries that would be the main targets of immigration and the
main sources of international transfers in the free migration equilibrium will
decide, if the asymmetry is large enough, to prevent the free flow of workers
into their borders. By doing so, they will also simultaneously distort their
choice of internal regional policy - the externalities abroad are no longer
fully internalized. Achieving the eﬃcient economic allocation now requires
a coordinated agreement: border policies aﬀecting the international flows of
workers and international transfers both need to be chosen cooperatively to
induce the correct regional density of workers and, at the same time, the dif-
ferential in per capita income that richer countries demand for remaining in
the Union. If enlargement of the Union implies accepting countries that are
progressively further away from the Union core, then enlargement increases
the likelihood of unilaterally imposed obstacles to free migration, and, there-
fore, the need for coordinated action. It may be good to remember, though,
that part of that coordination is used to reduce the unsustainable uniformity
that would be brought about by full integration.
With respect to the actual policies of the European Union, it seems hardly
surprising, then, that the transfers toward the Union’s poorer regions are ac-
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companied by other transfers targeting richer areas. Figure 4 is a map of the
regions of the European Union that qualify for redistributive transfers either
because they are poor, or because they experience "structural diﬃculties".
The contrast to Figure 1.1 is quite clear.23
The model described in the paper was designed to handle multiple and
heterogeneous countries as simply as possible, and thus to address issues
related to the enlargement of an existing Union. But its three-level structure
opens naturally questions of political economy that we have not pursued here.
The fundamental tension captured by the model is between the two regions,
core and periphery, not between richer and poorer countries. Inside any one
country the necessary regional transfers could well generate disagreement,
and an interesting issue is whether such internal regional disputes would be
exacerbated or reduced by the existence and the expansion of the Union. We
can conjecture, for example, that with free migration expansion of the Union
should increase regional tensions in larger core countries, whose core regions
come to face the extra burden of new international transfers, and reduce them
in smaller core countries. But the possibility of imposing borders barriers,
itself of course a policy choice the country must make as a whole, may well
change the result. A second interesting, and possibly important, question is
the identification of the correct decision-making unit. If the natural economic
borders are regional, does it still follow that the correct political borders are
national? We leave both of these points for future research.
23These second flows of funds are much smaller in volume, but if we were to add transfers
related to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) the point would emerge clearly. In 2000,
for example, disbursements under the Guarantee section of the CAP, by far the largest,
amounted to a total of 40,467 million ECU, v/s 27,585 million for all other redistribution
programs. France alone received more than 22 percent of CAP resources; another 9
percent went to Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. None of these countries has
regions qualifying for transfers because of economic backwardness (if we exclude France’s
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The reasoning in the text establishes n∗∗ic =
n∗∗c > 1∀i. It follows then that at the optimum hi = h= n∗∗c −c(n∗∗c ) and hip =













the optimum n∗∗c depends exclusively on αc. Notice that since hi = h
and hip = hp, per capita taxes in the core tc and per capita transfers in
the periphery τ p must be equal in all countries. Focus now on the case
n∗∗ip = n∗∗p ∀i. (i) Country i is a net disburser of international transfers iﬀ





or: τ p = (tcncαc)/(npαp). Substituting this expression in the inequality,
we obtain that country i is a net disburser iﬀ αic/αip > αc/αp, or, since
αip = 1−αic and αp = 1−αc, iﬀ αic > αc. (ii) Call Pi population in coun-
try i, i.e. Pi = ncαic+npαip, where, given
P
Pi = n, np = (1−ncαc)/(1−αc).
Thus we can write: Pi = [nc(αic − αc) + 1 − αic]/(1 − αc). It follows that
Pi > 1 ⇐⇒ (nc − 1)(αic − αc) > 0. But n∗∗c > 1; hence country i is a
migration destination iﬀ αic > αc.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the case of two countries, where
P is the population in country 1, and (2 − P ) the population of country 2.
Begin with the central planner’s problem. The central planner maximizes
total net income G and solves:
max
{n1c,n2c,P}
G = α1cn1ch1(n1c, n2c) + (P − α1cn1c)h1p(n1c, n2c, P ) +
+α2cn2ch2(n1c, n2c) + (2− P − α2cn2c)h2p(n1c, n2c, P )
The first order conditions are given by:
∂G
∂n1c
= α1ch1 + α1cn1c
∂h1
∂n1c






























= h1p + (P − α1cn1c)
∂h1p
∂P




Now consider the individual countries’ problem. As in the one-country
analysis, each national policy-maker has direct control over the density in his
national core region (and will use internal transfers to decentralize it); the
complication is that population is not fixed, but determined endogenously
via migration. Migration occurs unless per capita incomes are equalized, and
is thus influenced by regional densities and by international transfers. As
noticed by Myers (1990), the analysis should allow for endogenous interna-
tional transfers, with the constraint that countries can only choose to make
non-negative transfers abroad. Each national policy-maker maximizes per
capita income in his own country (g1and g2). Calling T the net international








subj. to (C1) :
1
P
[α1cn1ch1 + (P − α1cn1c)h1p]− T =
=
1
2− P [α2cn2ch2 + (2− P − α2cn2c)h2p] +
TP
2− P
(C2) : T ≥ 0
Notice that (C1) can also be written more concisely as: g1−T = g2+TP/(2−
P ). Ignoring (C2) for now, we derive the first order conditions:
∂g1
∂n1c
= [α1ch1 + α1cn1c
∂h1
∂n1c













































































(2− P )2 ]
Or, substituting from (4) and simplifying,
dP
·





















α2cn2c ∂h2∂n1c + (2− P − α2cn2c)
∂h2p
∂n1c
h2p − (2− P − α2cn2c)∂h2p∂P − g1
(8)
We follow the same procedure to obtain dP/dT . Totally diﬀerentiating





h2p − (2− P − α2cn2c)∂h2p∂P − g1
(9)
Hence we can write (5) as:
h2p − (2− P − α2cn2c)
∂h2p
∂P




















Equations (10) and (11) replicate (1) and (3), the central planner’s first
order conditions with respect to P and to n1c. Following identical logic, it is
possible to show that solving country 2’s problem leads to replicating (2), the
central planners’ first order condition with respect to n2c (we leave this step
to the reader). The two countries’ uncoordinated equilibrium replicate the
central planner’s allocation. Notice that the density in the core regions and
per capita income are determined uniquely. In the symmetrical equilibrium
where n1p = n2p, P is also determined (as are, correspondingly, international
transfers. See Proposition 1). However, as discussed in the text, there also
exist asymmetrical equilibria where, as long as nip ≤ 1, i = {1, 2}, only 2 out
of the 3 variables {n1p, n2p, P} are determined by the maximization problem.
This indeterminacy is irrelevant for production eﬃciency, congestion costs
and welfare, but extends to the level of transfers. It is not diﬃcult to verify
that for all n1p/n2p ≤ (α1cα2p)/(α2cα1p) (a ratio larger than 1), equilibrium
transfers from country 1 to country 2 are positive, and the analysis above
applies: country 1 will set the transfers so as to obtain the optimal alloca-
tion. If n1p/n2p > (α1cα2p)/(α2cα1p), the selected equilibrium has transfers
flowing in the opposite direction, and the relevant first order condition will
be obtained from country 2’s problem.
In the case of n countries, the analysis is much more cumbersome, but
conceptually nothing changes (as shown formally by Myers, 1990). Each
country chooses the level of transfers it disburses to each other country,
taking as given the transfers by others. Notice once again the strength
of the free migration hypothesis: any temptation to free ride is immediately
checked by the realization that all disparities in per capita income would give
rise to migration. Suppose a country were to shirk on its foreign obligations,
counting on other governments taking up the needed transfers; if the decline
in transfers implied an increase in per capita income for the country’s citizens,
immigration would follow, until incomes were again equalized. There is a
unique core density that maximizes per capita income, conditional on no
migration in equilibrium; to maintain that core density, the new immigrants
would be shifted to the periphery, and the savings in international transfers
would evaporate in increased domestic transfers.
Proof of Proposition 3. We must show that country i will choose
the eﬃcient core density n∗∗c and achieve required per capita income gi in the
presence of migration costs c∗∗i and international transfers T ∗∗i . Consider









subj. to (C10) :
1
P
[α1cn1ch1 + (P − α1cn1c)h1p]− T − c∗∗ =
=
1
2− P [α2cn2ch2 + (2− P − α2cn2c)h2p] +
TP
2− P
(C20) : T = T ∗∗




α2cn2c ∂h2∂n1c + (2− P − α2cn2c)
∂h2p
∂n1c
h2p − (2− P − α2cn2c)∂h2p∂P − g1 + c∗∗
(12)
Comparing (1) and (4), we obtain that optimality then requires:
c∗∗ = h1p − h2p + (P − α1cn∗∗1c)
∂h1p
∂P




where P is set equal to P ∗∗, the solution of equation (3) at n∗∗1c , n∗∗2c . T ∗∗
must then be defined by the solution to (C10), again at P = P ∗∗. With our
functional forms there is a range of values for P that satisfy optimality, but
to each of these values corresponds a specific T ∗∗(P ).
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FIGURE 1 
                                   
Source: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/objective1/map_en.htm
Figure 1.1: EU regions eligible for Structural Funds  under Objective 1 in 2000-06.  (Income per
capita below 75 percent of EU average in 1994-99
Figure 1.2: The model.
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FIGURE 5
                               
Source: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/funds/prord/guide/euro2000-2006_en.htm
European Union regions eligible for redistribution transfers under Objective 1 and Objective 2 of the
Structural Funds in 2000-06.
